

October 8, 1965

tures a study of the 1st amendment to the Constitution.

As a native of our fine State of Alabama, it is with equal pride and commendation that I point to the forthright courage of WBRC-TV in taking a position of leadership in planning and bringing to fruition such a series as "Rights and Responsibilities."

The programs, which are perhaps best described as a determined effort to relate our responsibilities to our rights, present discussions by such persons as Dr. Billy Graham, recognized throughout the world as a member of the clergy who represents both leadership and a high sense of moral integrity.

There are others in this initial set of programs who share equal position in their own fields of endeavor. Pat Boone, famous on movie screen and television, presents two of these 5-minute color television features.

Others participating in this series are Art Linkletter, nationally known as an entertainer in both radio and television, and Bob Considine, one of our country's leading newspaper reporters and writers.

This series, although produced at some considerable expense by the Taft Broadcasting Co., will be offered at no cost to all commercial and educational television and radio stations in the country.

Dr. Graham addresses himself to "Freedom of Religion," while Mr. Considine reviews "Freedom of the Press," Mr. Linkletter analyzes "Freedom of Speech," and Mr. Boone presents a discussion on "Background to the 1st Amendment" and "The Rights of Assembly and Petition."

I am told that future programs dealing with the Bill of Rights are in production.

Mr. Schlunkert, in introducing the series, said in part:

The great city of Birmingham has been the focus of national attention in recent years as a result of the dialog on civil rights. We recommended the development of this series because we believed that citizens everywhere would profit by a clear delineation of the responsibilities that accompany the rights reserved to us, employing the broadcast media as the most effective way to reach the most people.

Mr. Lawrence H. Rogers, II, president of the Taft Broadcasting Co., said further:

After studying Mr. Schlunkert's suggestion, and recognizing the critical need of a re-study of the Bill of Rights and the implicit responsibilities required of every citizen, we decided to place our fullest possible resources behind this effort. We have sought and obtained the services of eminent performers and writers whose names are calculated to attract the largest potential audiences.

May I say, Mr. President, to you and to my distinguished colleagues, after seeing this preview presentation of these programs, every thought expressed by both Mr. Rogers and Mr. Schlunkert has reached full realization.

For example, a part of Mr. Linkletter's statement reads:

The architects of our Republic put into our hands the most powerful forces for criticism and reform that have ever been accorded any people in any country. They said if you are silent when you disagree, you

become the victim of your own silence. If you fail to use this freedom, you abdicate responsibility.

Or take the words of Dr. Graham, a part of his stirring presentation:

Remember how the amendment begins: "Congress shall make no law * * *"

Those five words express the most daring concept of true freedom that has ever existed—no human law can come between a man and God. But this right to enjoy freedom of religion—like all rights—has a corresponding responsibility. Not only must we give to other faiths the privileges we enjoy, but we must make sure that we ourselves do not misuse or abuse this precious heritage.

This series of programs developed by the Taft Broadcasting Co. deserves high commendation. It should make us all proud to be part of a generation that has produced such leaders in this most advanced form of communication—broadcasting.

REVITALIZATION OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, Adm. Wilfred J. McNeil, president of the Grace Line, recently submitted to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation a statement of position and outline of recommendations for revitalization of the merchant marine.

The proposals of Admiral McNeil contain many positive suggestions which would require legislative action and substantial changes in present administrative policies.

I believe that his statement should be studied by all of us who have an interest in the maintenance of an adequate and healthy U.S. flag merchant marine. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to include the statement in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF POSITION AND OUTLINE OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A REVITALIZATION OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

There is general agreement that the U.S. Government's policy on the merchant marine is in need of a new look if the U.S. merchant marine is to be revitalized sufficiently to play the substantial role in the carriage of our foreign commerce which the American people expect and our national well-being requires. First, it is essential that it be recognized that the merchant marine involved in foreign trade consists basically of three major and distinct segments: (a) common-carrier liners; (b) industrial carriers of proprietary cargoes; and (c) tramps or for-hire vessels. Each segment requires somewhat different treatment.

The problem is by no means impossible or even overly difficult of solution in comparison with other problems which Government and industry have met and solved in our generation. Able men who will apply common sense and vigor to the task can, with a number of specific steps which we outline below, turn the situation of the U.S. merchant marine into one of which we can all be proud.

II. LINER SEGMENT IS BASICALLY SOUND

The liner segment of the merchant marine is basically sound as a result of successful implementation of the 1936 act as a liner act. U.S.-flag liners carry almost 40 percent of

the revenue tons in the total commercial U.S. liner freight market.

With exception of the United Kingdom, our present cargo liner fleet is larger than that of any other maritime power.

Our cargo liner fleet now includes more than four times as many 20-knot ships as any other fleet in the world; the subsidized lines are currently building 75 percent of the world production of such high-speed liner ships.

When the current vessel replacement program is completed, the United States will have the newest and most modern fleet of cargo liners of any nation, with shipboard automation and cargo handling equipment second to none.

III. OBSTACLES TO GREATER PROGRESS UNDER 1936 ACT

Since the passage of the 1936 act:

Successive administrative decisions within the Maritime Administration have added a large body of regulation and interpretation to the basic language of the 1936 act, most of which tends to dilute and erode the parity concept and purpose as initially laid down by Congress and which was the basis for many of the liner companies proceeding under the U.S. flag.

MARAD has issued a long list of arbitrary rulings over the years denying parity on a number of operation and construction items. The cumulative effect has become unbearable as a result of proposed and possible major disallowances applicable to (1) manning, (2) wages, and (3) pension and other benefits arrived at through open and honest collective bargaining. (Even though some recent decisions by the Maritime Subsidy Board have been reversed by the Secretary of Commerce, the effect of the Secretary's new procedure is still retroactive since new commitments made in good faith under long term contracts would be subject to disallowance after the fact.)

The Maritime Subsidy Board is attempting without congressional approval or action to change the scope and purpose of the act by issuing a series of new regulations and policy directives which depart from the congressionally mandated parity principle:

"4. The granting of the aid applied for is necessary to place the proposed operations of the vessel or vessels on a parity with those of foreign competitors * * ." (46 U.S.C. 1171.)

Continuing inability of the U.S. liner fleet to guarantee shippers and travelers dependable and regular service because of strikes and work stoppages. (A large part of the labor problem is brought on because of a lack of adequate machinery to settle manning and work disputes of an interunion nature that are now aggravated by the trend toward shipboard automation.)

IV. OUTLINE PLAN FOR REVITALIZATION OF THE MERCHANT MARINE

A. Reaffirm the parity principle of the 1936 act and simplify administration

1. Through congressional review and executive action, rescind the large body of restrictive administrative rules and regulations that have diluted the parity principle since passage of the act. (Parity does not guarantee profits; it is intended only to put the U.S.-flag operator on an equal footing with his foreign competitor by offsetting the extra costs of having to maintain high American standards in conducting business in the United States, particularly in wages paid to seamen.)

2. Administrative requirements and accounting procedures connected with subsidy payments are unduly complicated and expensive for the U.S. Government and the operator. These can and should be simplified.

3. Create an atmosphere which will encourage private capital to invest in the shipping business under the U.S. flag.

October 8, 1965

B. Continue the trade-route concept in the liner trades

Strengthen the trade-route concept further by substituting minimum/maximum ships or ship-days per year for present system of minimum/maximum voyages in each trade route and allow for reasonable profit-making opportunities through greater flexibility in ports of call as service demands for various voyages on any given trade route.

C. Separate ship construction and ship operation subsidy support

Establish construction-differential subsidy payments on a basis of direct support to the shipbuilding industry rather than through the ship operator. The present arrangement needlessly involves the ship operator in support of the shipbuilding industry which has no direct relationship to efficient ship management or operation. (The ship operator is a buyer and user of a transportation vehicle and the separation between him and the shipbuilder should be as distinct as between Boeing and United Airlines, Mohawk Airlines and British Aircraft Corp., or any manufacturer of equipment and user.)

Establish a level of activity necessary to the maintenance of an adequate ship-construction industry. Make subsidy payments to support shipyards up to that level, regardless of the volume of shipbuilding for U.S.-flag carriers. The shipyards, with costs equalized, could then bid for work on an international basis, and be kept sound regardless of level of ship orders from American operators. Conversely, U.S. operators could build their ships abroad and register them under U.S. flag for operation should the subsidy for U.S. shipyards be exhausted or U.S. shipyards were not reasonably competitive even after subsidy. (An example of such a system is the French Government's method of subsidizing shipyards. A construction differential is paid directly to the yards who are then free to bid for foreign as well as French operators' work; in 1963, 35 percent of French yards' work of 440,000 gross tons was for foreign account and in 1964, 18 percent of a total of 538,000 gross tons was for foreign account.)

The present tripartite arrangement involving the ship operator as well as the shipyards and the Government results in:

1. Pressure for uneconomic standardization.
2. The Government exercising prerogatives of management in dictating details of design and construction of vessels because of a false sense of partial ownership of the equipment. The operator, it should be remembered, pays the full world price for his vessel, while the Government is actually helping the U.S. shipbuilder through a construction subsidy. The ship operator is benefited only to the extent that he is able to use tax-deferred reserves for construction of his vessels.

3. An inefficient, uneconomic, and often controversial contracting system between the shipowner, shipbuilder, and the Government.

As an immediate measure, the present tripartite arrangement should be modified to permit a more direct contract relationship between the builder and the operator. Also in the interim, comparisons for subsidy purposes must continue to be based on construction prices in the lowest-priced responsible shipbuilding country.

D. Broaden the national maritime policy

As a condition for a vigorous new Government policy for a larger merchant marine, as outlined below, obtain maritime labor concurrence in cutting costs for all segments of the merchant marine through automation and proper manning scales; and in reducing or eliminating problems resulting from interunion rivalry—perhaps through consolidation of seagoing personnel into two national groups, one for unlicensed and one for licensed personnel, or for some adequate

permanent machinery for the settlement of disputes of an interunion nature.

With such assurance, the U.S. Government might then proceed to bring life to other segments of the merchant marine, by giving consideration to the following:

1. Approving a plan for the construction of up to 200 bulk vessels over a 5- to 10-year period, if found commercially feasible, under the terms governing liner ship construction to be conditioned upon agreement by labor to a workable mechanism for the settlement of manning and related work disputes as well as jurisdictional disputes of an interunion nature. Providing operating subsidies for such new and modern bulk carriers in the tramp trades to responsible U.S.-flag operators, including operators presently holding Government liner-operating contracts. Such operators should be required to enter into an operating contract that includes:

- (a) Provisions for compulsory replacement of such vessels through tax-deferred reserves;
- (b) A limitation of operation to shipload or bulk cargoes but without trade-route restrictions. Partial cargoes would continue to move in liners on trade routes under conference rules.

As rapidly as the new bulk fleet is available, permit only world rates to be charged (eliminate premium rate payments) for Government-sponsored, shipload cargoes as an offset to the cost of operating subsidies. (As an example of other beneficial effects, such action should also serve to stimulate overseas sales of farm surplus.) The plan outlined above will require additional funds for subsidies to shipyards for ship construction if an additional number of ships are to be built in U.S. yards. The overall Federal budget might well be kept at the same level through reevaluation of national priorities.

2. Making special provisions for industrial ocean carriers of proprietary cargoes to convert to U.S.-flag operation through favorable depreciation schedules, tax deferment on ship replacement reserves, permission to build abroad if necessary, and other similar incentives.

3. Undertaking an aggressive program for the replacement of passenger ships designed to compete on a worldwide basis for the seagoing traveler. (Every significant maritime nation is today embarked on such a program for prestige, defense readiness, benefits to its cargo-carrying trade, and other national interests.)

E. Other steps generally applicable to all segments

1. Establish a Federal ship mortgage corporation and make Federal credit available to all segments of U.S.-flag shipping industry at reasonable rates; permit these and reserve funds to be used for land transportation equipment and facilities where they are an adjunct to ocean transportation, in line with the modern trend toward integrated transportation.

2. Redirect efforts of MARAD to meaningful and commercially applicable research, experimentation, and cooperative assistance to the industry in developing new techniques in shipbuilding, shipping operation, port facilities, cargo handling, integration of different modes of transportation, and passenger-trade facilitation, promotion, and development. The liner fleet operators stand ready to contribute to such a program. Programs such as nuclear propulsion of surface ships, surface-effect ships, and similar long-range research, should be left to the Navy to accomplish because of their facilities and the lack of immediate value to commercial operations. These programs would have more immediate promise for military purposes.

3. Take appropriate action to implement and live up to agreements providing equal access to cargoes in foreign trade. Administration of the cargo preference laws must

allow for granting necessary waivers to foreign-flag carriers to maintain good faith in the equal access agreements negotiated by U.S.-flag carriers with their foreign competitors under the direction and with the approval of U.S. Government agencies.

4. Continue the present policy of cargo preference, but improve administration through centralized statistical and routing control.

5. Develop and carry out an adequately financed and manned program for promotion of the U.S. merchant marine contemplated by the 1936 act. This activity should consist of an intensive and continuing effort on the part of the U.S. Government utilizing all available information media, direct solicitation and contact, speakers' bureau, and the other standard paraphernalia of product promotion and public relations.

W. J. McNEIL,
President,
Grace Line, Inc.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, while there are those who still insist that the administration failed to prove its case in arguing that the Dominican revolt had been taken over by the Communists, the news now coming out of the Dominican Republic should be sufficient to prove to all but the wilfully blind that the administration's estimate of the degree of Communist influence and control in the rebel movement was, if anything, an underestimate.

Under the protection of the cease-fire, the Communists emerged openly as the real controllers of the rebel sector.

They openly operated three training centers for propagandists and guerrillas, which are reputed to have graduated more than 5,000 alumni, who have now fanned out throughout the territory of the Republic.

By various devices they smuggled most of their arms out of the zone into the countryside. Some estimates have it that more than 10,000 weapons were moved into the countryside in this manner, while the negotiations between the junta and the rebel forces were going on.

Today in Santo Domingo there is alarming evidence that pro-Communists have been given a number of highly important positions in the provisional government of Garcia Godoy.

There is also the alarming fact that the only two papers published in the entire country are the Communist papers printed in the rebel zone.

The major Dominican papers, which are anti-Communist, remain shut down because of the strike by workers under Communist influence.

There is the further alarming fact that the Communists have apparently been able to take over control of the University of Santo Domingo.

Mr. President, I would strongly urge all of my colleagues and especially those who have had doubts about the degree of Communist influence in the rebel movement, to read the several items which I now ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record.

The first item is an article by Andrew C. McClellan, AFL-CIO inter-American

representative, in the Inter-American Labor Bulletin.

The second item is the transcript of a ABC radio program, in which Mr. McClellan was interviewed by Mr. Harry W. Flannery.

The third item is a remarkably detailed article by the veteran U.S. News & World Report correspondent, Mr. Howard Handelmann.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Inter-American Labor Bulletin, September 1965]

COMMUNISTS' CONTROL OF REBELS SEEN AS THREAT TO DOMINICAN STABILITY

(By Andrew C. McClellan)

(NOTE.—The following article is based on a recent visit to the Dominican Republic by the AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative. It is a sequel to an earlier firsthand report published in the June issue of the Inter-American Labor Bulletin.)

Although the OAS Ad Hoc Commission announced that leaders of the two opposing forces in the Dominican Republic on August 11 had reached an agreement of reconciliation and defined terms for the installation of a Provisional Government, it is doubtful that, in present circumstances, the existing political stalemate will be broken for many months to come. Communist influence and dominance over the rebel forces appears to be strong enough to stall any meaningful settlement.

Prior to August 11, in an effort to pressure the leaders of the warring factions to expedite an agreement, wide publicity had been given to three documents drafted in consultation with the two warring factions. The three documents were the Institutional Act, to serve as a temporary political constitution until the election of a constitutional government 9 months from the installation of a Provisional Government; an "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" spelling out the terms of the settlement between the opposing factions; and the declaration to the Dominican people.

PROVIDE GENERAL AMNESTY

The two acts provide for a general amnesty, incorporation of the rebel zone (an estimated 80 blocks in downtown Santo Domingo) into the security zone, abolition of the zone in 30 days, collection of all arms in the hands of civilians, and negotiations between the Provisional regime and the OAS to decide the functions and programming of the withdrawal of the 12,000-man Inter-American Peace Force. Meanwhile, all Dominican officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, would return to their respective bases, holding the ranks and grades held as of April 24, with full guarantees that no reprisals would be taken for their acts during the revolution, except in the cases of "acts of common crime."

While both General Imbert and Colonel Camaano had agreed to the draft documents, Camaano's Communist and extreme leftist advisers informed the OAS Ad Hoc Commission that Camaano lacked the authority to agree to the documents and that such authority rested in the Council members. It is these elements which are now blocking the adoption of the peace formula designed to end the 3-month conflict.

Foreign correspondents and other informed sources are convinced that Colonel Camaano and his collaborators are captive of the Communists and extremists in the rebel camp. The moderate elements are obviously afraid to challenge the extremists who are admittedly a minority faction but heavily armed and united.

Informed sources in Santo Domingo believe that the Communist elements concluded

weeks ago that each day which passes without settlement is another day of victory for them. The delay affords them additional time for the guerrilla training and indoctrination programs they initiated weeks ago, and nourishes the seeds of anti-Americanism they have so well planted.

On August 8, the executive committee of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) met in a "pleno" and publicly announced that it had changed the name of the party to the Dominican Communist Party (PCD) announcing in the rebel newspaper, "Patria," that the new name is "more scientifically exact and eliminates all doubts about the ends we pursue, and presents us before the eyes of the working class and the people as that which we really are—fighters for the cause of communism." The new PCD is the pro-Soviet wing of the Dominican Communist group.

The pro-Peiping group, the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) now identifies itself publicly as the "partido marxistaleninista" and is attacking the new PCD as being "revisionist." It states that the PCD "remains in its erroneous position" in spite of having changed its name.

The MPD is calling for a "prolonged war against the Yankee invaders," while the PCD has taken a position supporting negotiations with the OAS on the grounds that the rebels are surrounded by a superior Yankee force and should agree to a provisional government rather than attempt a suicidal armed struggle.

The pro-Castro group, the 14th of June Movement (largest of the three groups) is a definite and decisive part of the rebel movement, is consulted on policy decisions, is considered extremely influential among the militia, and is opposing any settlement until the Inter-American Peace Force is removed.

INDOCTRINATED BY REBELS

During a visit to Santiago de los Caballeros, I met some young men who had received Communist indoctrination in the rebel zone. The program had lasted about 2 weeks and consisted of lectures, films, demonstrations, and a little drilling. The youngsters stated that there were large groups from the various provincial areas receiving this type of indoctrination. A second contingent of nine youngsters was to have left Santiago, Tuesday, August 17, for the rebel zone and a 2-week period of training.

Besides the indoctrination program (which, according to reports emanating from the rebel zone, is shooting for a total of 300,000); military and guerrilla training is being openly conducted with an estimated 1,500 militiamen. These are uniformed militia, training with arms.

It is reliably reported that a large contingent of young Haitians is being trained in guerrilla warfare in the rebel zone. Conatral has some 30,000 Haitian cane cutters organized in the Sugar Workers Federation. There is speculation that some of the young Haitians are being trained to infiltrate the democratic labor movement through the sugar workers union in order to capture control of the broad-based, numerically strong National Sugar Workers Federation.

Obviously then, the 14th of June Movement, which is sponsoring these programs, will not permit Camaano to sign any agreement for the establishment of a provisional government until the training objectives have been reached.

Estimates vary as to the number of people in the rebel zone. American Embassy sources estimate a rebel zone total population of 10,000 people. Some correspondents estimate the total to be as high as 15,000. General Palmer, commanding the U.S. forces in Santo Domingo, feels that the 10,000 estimate is more accurate.

The best available sources report that around 25,000 arms are in the hands of civilians. This is the number of arms indis-

criminatedly distributed to the civilians on April 24. The OAS Ad Hoc Commission naively expects that the civilians will surrender these arms as soon as the act of reconciliations is signed and a provisional government is installed. The military and paramilitary training now being conducted in the rebel zone indicates that future guerrilla tactics or campaigns lie ahead and arms will be needed. Most of the arms have already probably been cached along with ammunition and supplies for future prolonged guerrilla warfare in the interior.

THE LABOR SITUATION

Conatral, the democratic labor confederation and the Dominican ORIT affiliate, has remained neutral during the revolution. It refuses to support either General Imbert or Colonel Camaano. In the early days of the revolution, the Conatral headquarters was assaulted by rebels led by known Communist elements who stole all the office equipment, typewriters, mimeograph machines, tape recorders, and personal effects; destroyed the records and files; and set up a defense command post in the building. Five of the nine jeeps were burned or confiscated. On Saturday, August 14, a rebel defector informed us that some of the office furniture was still in the building.

The executive committee members of Conatral are now operating temporarily from the AIFLD Institute with the ORIT representative. The institute is located in the international security zone. With the four remaining jeeps, the leaders of Conatral have maintained contact with the provincial federations and most of the provincial unions throughout the country.

During my stay in the Dominican Republic, I visited the Cibao area, which is the main agricultural and industrial center of the interior. I was able to ascertain that the democratic labor movement has remained intact since the revolution started. Outside Santo Domingo there is no curfew. Except for the military roadblocks on the main highways, the country appears to be normal. Seasonal unemployment in the sugar industry is normal and the banana workers report that the same situation exists in the banana zone.

All factories are working, retail sales are slightly above those of the same period last year, agricultural produce is easily obtainable and no food shortages are evident in the interior.

The provincial Dominicans appear to be curiously detached from the political chaos in Santo Domingo.

UNEMPLOYMENT IS HIGH

Unemployment has always been a major problem in the Dominican Republic, and all available estimates at this time indicate that the unemployment and underemployment level is approximately 37 percent. In normal times, international charity organizations were feeding 7 percent of the total population. At the beginning of the revolution some 17 percent of the people were being given food. Today, it is estimated that some 12 percent are receiving free food.

Seven of the major banks are in the rebel zone. Many of the labor organizations have accounts in these banks. These accounts are now frozen. At the same time, the flow of credit has been crippled, and businessmen and industrialists operating on limited capital, are finding it difficult to pay salaries and maintain their inventories. Two-thirds of the sugar industry is owned by the Government through the Dominican Sugar Corp. Because of the shortage of currency, sugar workers' wages in the corporation are running behind 6 to 8 weeks.

The OAS, which had been funding the Loyalist government operation, has shut off the funding, with public employees and civil servants unpaid since July.

The Hotel Workers Federation has established a mutual aid fund for an estimated

300 hotel workers whose places of employment are in the rebel zone and closed down. Similar efforts are being made to assist commercial workers and retail clerks who are unemployed for basically the same reason. These two groups appear to be the most affected by the situation in Santo Domingo.

SOME UNIONS BENEFIT

Many trade union groups still find the present situation favorable. Besides those mentioned above, the transport workers and taxi drivers are busier than normal. In fact, it was the increase in vehicular traffic which caused a gasoline shortage.

The revolutionary labor arm of Bosch's PRD, FOUPSA-CESITRADO, and the CLASC affiliate, CASC, are supporting Camaano and the rebels. Because of this, a number of CASC affiliates in the provinces have disaffiliated from the parent organization. Five industrial unions in Santiago alone have disaffiliated from CASC.

Conatral leaders are attempting to fill the trade union vacuum in the provinces and are programming a campesino program in the rural areas. Emilio Antonio Checo, the Dominican leader trained at the AIFLD Institute in Honduras through the joint AIFLD/ORIT/AFL-CIO campesino program, is now setting up a 2-month campesino training program in Vega.

Latest reports from the Dominican Republic indicate that an agreement, acceptable to both factions, has been reached, on the basis of modifications to the Act of Reconciliation. The provisional presidential candidate is Hector Garcia Godoy, who is expected to be sworn in and form a coalition cabinet. The provisional government will reportedly remain in office for 9 months, and prepare for elections to be held at the end of the 9-month's period.

The provisional government will face many problems, which no amount of economic aid can solve. The matter of the arms recovery is regarded as a major problem, as is the political turmoil to which the country will be exposed as the many political parties vie for support during the 9-month caretaker period.

Garcia Godoy, according to his own statements, expects to form a cabinet of "honest, dedicated, capable men * * *". However, under the present political situation such men will be difficult to find, and those who appear to be willing to serve in a caretaker government, are politicians whose only interest will be the furtherance of the aims of the political parties they represent. Under these circumstances, social-economic development is virtually impossible, and political stability a long way off.

[Broadcast of "As We See It," AFL-CIO public service program, American Broadcasting Co., Oct. 3, 1965]

REDS STILL STRONG IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Participant: Andrew C. McLellan, AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative.

Moderator: Harry W. Flannery.

Mr. FLANNERY. "As We See It."

Mr. MCLELLAN. Communist influence continues in Santo Domingo today.

Mr. FLANNERY. Andrew C. McLellan, AFL-CIO Inter-American representative, in his latest report on the Dominican Republic, as interviewed for this radio station of the ABC network and the AFL-CIO.

Mr. McLellan, prominent Members of Congress, a number of editors, writers, and professors have made the charge that the Communist threat in the Dominican Republic has been grossly exaggerated, and that the United States did not need to intervene there. What is your reaction, Mr. McLellan?

Mr. MCLELLAN. Well, of course, I completely disagree with those who felt our intervention was hasty and didn't help the situation. I think that Senator Dodd, in his recorded reply to Senator Fulbright's statement, stated the

case quite clearly. He pointed out a number of holes in many of the hypotheses of Senator Fulbright's position. I think many people in the Dominican Republic today are happy because the United States intervened when it did and with the force it did.

Mr. FLANNERY. In other words, you are saying that there was Communist influence in the revolution.

Mr. MCLELLAN. Definitely so.

Mr. FLANNERY. What about the democratic labor federation of Santo Domingo? Wasn't it attacked during this revolt period?

Mr. MCLELLAN. On the second day of the revolution, the offices of the National Confederation of Dominican Workers was assaulted, attacked. Equipment was stolen—typewriters, mimeograph machines, tape recorders—most of the written records were destroyed and the building was taken over as a rebel command post.

Mr. FLANNERY. Was the democratic labor confederation able to continue in any way?

Mr. MCLELLAN. Oh, yes. Five of the nine vehicles were either burned or confiscated by the rebels; but with four remaining vehicles, the executive committee of the democratic labor movement, Conatral, have successfully kept the labor movement in the Dominican Republic intact throughout these four very difficult months.

Mr. FLANNERY. Were there some embassies, too that were not reported in the early stories as having been attacked by the rebels in those early days?

Mr. MCLELLAN. To my knowledge, Mr. Flannery, five embassies were attacked besides the U.S. Embassy. One was badly burned—the Embassy of El Salvador.

Mr. FLANNERY. You had knowledge of this impending event, I believe before it occurred, didn't you, because of our contacts down there?

Mr. MCLELLAN. Yes. We have been watching the situation very carefully since an incident occurred last year; that was the blowing up of an army arsenal at Fort Ozama. The head of the triumvirate, Donald Reid Calval, invited an OAS investigating team to go down and investigate the situation. While, to my recollection, the report was never made public, they did establish the fact that there were rebellious officers in the army whom they described as the San Cristobal clique which were, in effect, setting the early stages for an insurrectional movement.

Recently, one of the top rebel military leaders defected from the rebel zone and sought asylum in Puerto Rico and on his arrival, he admitted that the insurrectional movement had actually been planned almost a year ago—which would coincide, pretty much, with this blowup of the arsenal. So, it wasn't a spontaneous insurrectional movement. The speed, the efficiency, the professional manner in which the revolution was mounted, indicates that this was planned, and very well planned.

Mr. FLANNERY. What you are saying, Mr. McLellan, is that if the United States had not intervened at the time it did, that we would have had another Communist state in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. MCLELLAN. I would say that there is a strong possibility that we would have had another Cuba on our hands.

Mr. FLANNERY. Is the situation improved today?

Mr. MCLELLAN. I don't know how you would discuss the situation as being improved. We do have peace between the warring factions. There is a provisional government.

Many of the requisites of the so-called act of reconciliation, which were signed by both warring factions, will not be lived up to, in my opinion. One, the demand that all the arms in civilian hands be turned over to the provincial government. I think it's naive to expect this. There are probably over

20,000, or maybe as many as 25,000, arms indiscriminately distributed in the early days of the revolution, in the hands of civilians. While a number of old weapons are being turned in to the arms checkpoints—as stated in the act of reconciliation—many of the new arms have already been hidden in the provinces and, I assume, will be used at some later date when another revolutionary period comes along.

Mr. FLANNERY. What about the Communist parties? I think you said previously that there are three major Communist parties in Santo Domingo. Are these still continuing and are they growing stronger or weaker?

Mr. MCLELLAN. I think they came out of this much stronger. The recent reports from the Dominican Republic indicate that when these young rebels began returning to their homes in some of the provincial areas, they went back convinced that they had won the revolution. They had intensive guerrilla training behind them—after 4 months in the rebel zone. They are very aggressive, they are returning home like heroes. They have been given intensive training, they know where arms can be located in the various caches and, more important, it was during the 4 months—or rather it was last month—when two of the Communist parties came out and openly declared themselves. The political group known as the Popular Socialist Party held a planning session in August and came out with its name changed to the Dominican Communist Party. This is a party which adheres to the Moscow wing.

The Popular Dominican Movement, or the group known as the MPD, began listing itself as the Marxist-Leninist party—this is the party which follows the Peiping line. And, of course, the larger party—the pro-Castro party, the 14th of June Movement, has never made any bones about its identification.

So, during this period, as I say, in the month of August, the three parties publicly stated what they were and what their role was in this whole revolutionary movement.

Mr. FLANNERY. What is the form of indoctrination and training in these parties?

Mr. MCLELLAN. There were two types of training going on in the zone during this 4-month period. There was indoctrination of youngsters from different parts of the country going on for 2 weeks of, I suppose, pro-Communist indoctrination. Some of the youngsters that I spoke to when I was over there some 3 or 4 weeks ago and who had received this training, said they saw Communist movies, they were lectured to by members of the Communist Party.

The other type of training was strictly paramilitary. Most of the foreign correspondents who visited the zone saw this training being conducted on a day-by-day basis. A group from 50 to 200 or 300 in different parts of the rebel zone were out daily exercising with weapons and drills and obstacle courses. There was additional information indicating that in the evenings they also were exposed to films, movies, and lectures on the manufacture of Molotov cocktails, tactics, sabotage procedures, and so on.

Mr. FLANNERY. Are these three major Communist Parties likely to get together? And, if they did get together at the time of elections, could they win the election, conceivably?

Mr. MCLELLAN. Well, I doubt that they would get together on the election front, although they had no difficulty in coordinating their activities within the rebel zone. We are thinking of a geographical area of probably 6 to 8 to 80 square blocks and they were able to live, work, and operate jointly in that zone.

At the time of the final negotiations for the termination of hostilities, the Peiping lining MPD group took the position that they should fight to the last man. The PSP, which later began the Dominican Commu-

nist Party, thought that that position was suicidal, that they didn't have the force or strength to defeat the Inter-American peace force. The 14th of June movement would have supported—and stated so—the more militant position—that is to say, they would have gone along with the Peiping lining MPD.

Mr. FLANNERY. Supposing the election does occur and whether or not they do unite, are the Communists liable to take over, or do the non-Communist parties have enough strength and are they united enough?

Mr. McLELLAN. I doubt that the Communist Party could take over in a free election in the foreseeable future. You must remember, Mr. Flannery, that the Dominican citizens were subjected to almost 32 years of anti-Communist tirades by Dictator Trujillo. I have traveled the length and breadth of the country and spent a considerable amount of time with plantation workers—mostly in the sugar and banana areas—and they have an inherent fear of communism. They don't know what it is, but they know it is bad, and I would imagine it would be very difficult for the Communist Parties to really build up the type of support and following necessary to win free democratic elections.

Mr. FLANNERY. That's the reason for their weapons and for their training.

Mr. McLELLAN. I would think so, yes.

Mr. FLANNERY. They probably don't want a free election then, do they?

Mr. McLELLAN. I doubt it.

Mr. FLANNERY. Meanwhile, is the situation, back in the country, in regard particularly to the production of bananas and sugar cane going on in a fairly normal basis?

Mr. McLELLAN. Yes. When I was there, which was in mid-August, it was difficult to believe, outside of Santo Domingo, that there was, in effect, a civil war underway in the country. The provincial citizens had a very curious detachment to the whole thing. They were going about their business. They were working. Businessmen were complaining about the fact that the line of credits were being weakened or shortened or being shut off because of the fact that seven of the major banks in the country were in the rebel zone. However, I found that commerce was almost normal or probably a little over normal. The sugar workers were working, the industrial workers were working. The only area effected, really, was the area controlled by the rebels—the 80 blocks in downtown Santo Domingo.

Mr. FLANNERY. Thank you, Andrew C. McLellan, AFL-CIO Inter-American representative.

Your reporter, Harry W. Flannery, invites you to be with us next week at this same time when "As We See It" again comes as a presentation of the AFL-CIO and ABC public affairs. This program has been brought to you by the ABC network and the affiliated station to which you are listening.

[From the U.S. News & World Report]

DOMINICAN PUZZLE: HAS UNITED STATES TURNED OVER A NATION TO THE REDS—TWO SIDES

(NOTE.—In April, President Johnson rushed Marines to the Dominican Republic to save American lives, prevent Reds from taking over a revolution. Five months later, a temporary Dominican President is in office. The United States has exiled the leader of anti-Communist military forces. The Communists continue to wield considerable power. And American troops are still there to guard an uncertain truce. This question is raised: Who really won in the Dominican Republic—the United States or Communists? Howard Handelman of U.S. News & World Report, who has covered the Dominican crisis from the start, gives the inside story.)

SANTO DOMINGO.—This is the story of the first days under the new Government of the Dominican Republic. That government,

headed by Héctor García Godoy, was set up on September 3 under a compromise arranged by the Organization of American States.

During the days that followed, the rebels seemed to be having things all their own way. They retained control of their own zone—downtown Santo Domingo. Government police and troops didn't even try to get in. They retained control of their arms—thousands of rifles and machineguns that they captured in the first days of the revolution, back in April.

The antirebel station run by the military at the San Isidro air base was ordered off the air. There was no other voice to counter the Communist propaganda of the newspaper "Patria," published in the rebel zone.

Rebel officials got jobs in the Government of García Godoy, including cabinet posts. Rebels made demands on García Godoy—he made no public demands on them.

Brig. Gen. Elías Wessin y Wessin, dedicated anti-Communist, was hustled out of the country in an American Air Force transport plane.

The general was put aboard under the watchful eye of five armed FBI agents and a large detachment from the 82d Airborne Division.

The whole atmosphere was one of rebel, or Communist, victory.

Downtown, in the rebel zone, people sang revolutionary songs. Groups of rebel warriors marched through the streets chanting revolutionary slogans.

In contrast, outside the rebel zone, there were no such celebrations or victory claims.

Instead, there was gloom. Some American businessmen pulled up stakes and left. Others requested transfers, or tried to settle their affairs so they could leave. Dominican anti-Communists, too, were down in the mouth. Some diplomats, from Europe and Latin America, were convinced that all was lost to the Communists.

As an example of the general gloom, an American resident told me: "You are here for a historic event—the first time that the American Army occupied a country in order to turn it over to the Communists."

A DIPLOMAT'S VIEW

One important Ambassador of a non-Latin country said: "Please tell me one single thing that is better for your country now than it was last April, when you sent in the marines. The Communists are stronger now than they ever have been in this country. They have come out in the open, publish their own newspaper, hold conventions, even call themselves Communists, openly."

"All the concessions are being made to the Communists—none to the other side. The rebels signed the compromise agreement to settle the civil war—but now they ask for more concessions before they will live up to their agreements. First it was Wessin y Wessin. Next it will be the other military chiefs. Already, the street mobs are demanding that they go. They are calling your Ambassador, Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, a Nazi—and demanding that he be kicked out."

"Their gall is enormous. In one edition of *Patria*, the Communists bragged in one statement that they were the power in the revolution—and, in another column, attacked Mr. Bennett for saying in April that Communists were threatening to seize control of the revolution."

"In these months of revolution, the Communists have built up their political and military apparatus far beyond anything they ever had here before."

"Also, the rebels now have the mystique—the glamour and prestige that go with standing up to the giants of the hemisphere and the world—the Yankees. They have the heroes and the legends and the slogans and the songs. They think they have won this revolution."

"I am afraid they are right."

This ambassador knows what the Americans are trying to do here—divide the rebels and then conquer them. He just doesn't think it will work. The Americans believe their formula does have a chance to work.

WHAT THE REBELS DIDN'T GET

To American officials, rebel gains at this point seem more apparent than real. The first job was to clean house on the right. Now the rebel turn is coming.

Rebels have not been granted any one of their fundamental demands.

The American officials say this:

When talks about a compromise settlement opened, the rebels plopped six basic demands on the table. Not a single one was accepted. The demands were:

Withdraw the Inter-American Peace Force immediately.

Fire all Dominican military chiefs of staff.

Name a rebel officer as Dominican Army chief of staff.

Let military men who joined the rebels return to their services with the advanced ranks to which the rebels promoted them.

Restore the 1963 constitution of Juan Bosch.

Reseat the Congress elected in the Bosch sweep of 1962.

Acceptance of these demands would have meant a rebel victory. United States is pleased that a compromise was signed—without giving in on any one of these demands.

The Inter-American Peace Force troops stay, indefinitely. The military chiefs of staff stay, at least for now. Wessin was not a chief of staff.

The Juan Bosch constitution is not accepted—and a new one is to be written.

No rebel officer gets high command. Officers who fought for the rebels return to the military—with the ranks they held on April 24, not with the ranks the rebels gave them. A new Congress is to be elected.

Biggest thing working against the Communists, in the U.S. view, is the continued presence of 82d Airborne Division troops. American officials here, privately, express the hope that the troopers will be kept here at least for the 9 months that the provisional government of García Godoy is in power.

A START BY GARCÍA GODOY

American officials are pleased with the start García Godoy has made. He is anti-Communist. He is consolidating his position with the military and explained to officers in advance why he had to get rid of Wessin. He is firming up ties with the influential "Santiago group" of businessmen. Early in the summer, United States tried to help this group form a provisional government. Now the United States is pleased that the group is helping García Godoy.

Among the things U.S. officials like about García Godoy are:

His firm stand against General Wessin. One U.S. official summed up American objections to Wessin by saying, "He is so rigidly anti-Communist that he creates more Communists than he destroys."

García Godoy's efforts to weaken the rebel side by giving good Government jobs to rebels who show signs of concern about Communist power downtown. These former rebels are watched carefully during their period of "rehabilitation." One already has been kicked out of the job of running the Government radio-TV station.

García Godoy's care to avoid actions so drastic that they carry too much risk of touching off new fighting.

The U.S. objective is to destroy the Communist power—without getting into another shooting war. Idea is to break the rebel hold on the downtown section, and have as many guns collected as possible, before even considering armed action. García Godoy shares these objectives.

October 8, 1965

25510

The United States is willing to wait a week or two to break the rebel hold on downtown, and collect guns. But it is recognized that, in the end, it may be necessary to send in Dominican troops and search every house for weapons.

Possibility of a pitched battle between Communist and non-Communist forces inside the rebel camp is not ruled out. There have been gunfights between these forces inside the rebel zone from time to time.

ACE IN THE HOLE?

As a result, there now is a tendency among American officials to look on the rebel "president," Col. Francisco Caamaño Dño, as an ace in the hole, on our side.

Conviction is that Caamaño doesn't want the Communists to grab power any more than García Godoy does.

Caamaño pledged that he would begin delivering guns soon. He also, according to U.S. officials, has gone back into the army—and accepts García Godoy as his commander in chief.

Others share the growing conviction that Caamaño will turn out to be an important factor against communism.

A Dominican nationalist, prorebel and anti-Yankee, says: "One of the strange things about this situation is that the only man who can save this country from communism, for you Yankees, is Caamaño—and I think he will."

A ROLE FOR THE REVOLUTIONISTS?

The role of Caamaño is just one of the things that make the Dominican problem so complicated. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, member of the OAS ad hoc committee that arranged the compromise settlement, has confided to several people that this has been the most complex problem which he ever has tackled.

The reasons are multiple—and obvious. Thirty years of Trujillo's dictatorship, to start with, sapped the spirit of the whole people. It was difficult to find anybody who would make a decision or take a stand.

The rebel forces were split into a number of splinter groups—moderates and non-Communist nationalists of various persuasions, plus Communists who follow the Chinese, Moscow, or Castro lines and fight among themselves.

On the other side, there was a lack of political effectiveness.

Old Trujillistas tried to muscle in, and did gain influence over the junta president, Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras. Old militarists jealously guarded their power and privilege.

Economically, the country is shot.

Cheating on the Government was a national pastime. Contraband was smuggled in by the military—and merchants. For political reasons, leaders who came after Trujillo inflated wages. At the same time, the props were knocked from under the Dominican export business by the collapse of world market prices for sugar, coffee, and cacao.

To straighten out the mess, it now seems clear, the United States will have to remain deeply involved in Dominican internal affairs for a long time to come.

Economically, the United States is going to have to keep the country afloat.

Politically, the United States already is deeply involved. President García Godoy already is getting political advice from U.S. officials here—although he does not accept it all.

As an example, U.S. officials have objected to several appointments García Godoy has made to his Cabinet, or to other high Government jobs. García Godoy has rejected the U.S. protests, for the most part.

One of his main explanations to American officials who object is this: Non-Communists in the rebel camp must not be isolated, forced to side with the Communists. They must be

given another way to go. He wants to offer them that "other way."

Therefore, he says, he is appointing as many moderates and non-Communists, from the rebel camp, as he can.

American officials are not 100 percent satisfied that this tactic will work—but are willing to let García Godoy give it a try. After all, American troops still are in the country, as insurance against a Communist takeover.

The García Godoy tactic is to divide and conquer—which is the U.S. tactic here, too.

THE DOUBLECROSS: A WAY OF LIFE

Involved in this tactic, of course, is the grand old practice of the doublecross. And the doublecross is a grand old Dominican habit, from way back. It is even contagious. Americans have caught the spirit, here, from time to time.

Some examples of the doublecross in this revolution:

Before the revolution, Imbert feared that former President Joaquín Balaguer, his political enemy, planned a coup. Imbert, though an anti-Communist, made a deal with the Castroite 14th of June Movement—even gave it arms.

During the first week in May, the United States decided Imbert was the man to form an anti-Communist junta. Former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was sent in to persuade Imbert—who really was reluctant, wanted no part of the mess. Mr. Martin denies it now, but some U.S. officials believe that he promised Imbert that the United States would recognize his junta, and help it. United States had no such intention.

Once the junta was formed, Imbert and the military chiefs vowed to stand together to the end. Then, by accident, Imbert learned the chiefs were talking to Mr. Bunker—the OAS negotiator—behind Imbert's back.

The rebels signed two cease-fire agreements—and kept neither.

The rebels signed the compromise peace—then made new demands before they would live up to the agreement.

It's a way of life in Santo Domingo—this doublecross.

The doublecross has to be stressed for one reason. If the tradition of the doublecross is not kept firmly in mind, too much weight might be given to the present promises and agreements.

Ambassador Bunker and his OAS colleagues found this out during the months that they worked to get a compromise political settlement. Promises made one day were broken the next.

For this reason, Americans discussing the chances of getting a settlement in fact, as well as on paper, always preface their discussions with the assurance that the American Army is in the country to protect American interests, if it has to.

U.S. officials make no bones about the fact that they hope the American Army stays in the Dominican Republic for at least 9 months—the full term of the García Godoy government. Some say they hope the troops stay even longer than that.

ANTI-COMMUNISTS, TOO, COULD MAKE TROUBLE

Elements of future trouble are present almost everywhere. Not only are the Communists organizing action groups around the country, and stockpiling weapons, but so are anti-Communist followers of Wessin y Wessin.

In this situation, President García Godoy is moving slowly. He has to, in order to avoid touching off new fighting that will blow up the whole effort to restore law and order and set up a stable Government.

He would like to crack down on the Communist newspaper, Patria, for example. But he can't risk it right now. Instead, he hopes the two big papers, El Caribe and Listín Diario, can resume publishing as soon as pos-

sible, so the people have something to read other than Communist propaganda. The two big papers have not published since the start of the revolution. Now the unions, presumably following Communist orders, are keeping them shut down by making exorbitant demands. Unions are demanding full pay for the 4 months that the papers were closed and had no income. Extremists in the unions also talk of handing the papers over to worker ownership and control—although they call it "people's" ownership.

Other things, too, bother U.S. officials.

Asked whether the Dominicans would be ready for elections in 9 months, one official gave a one-word answer: "No." Juan Bosch bothers the United States, too. To the U.S. Embassy people, Bosch is bad news. They blame him for much of what has gone on this summer. To them, he was a poor administrator, as President in 1962. He did things that helped Communists, like letting some of the most dangerous return from exile. Officials say his constitution of 1963 is a horror, with wording so vague that it gives the President almost any powers he wants to assume. He is anti-Yankee. He pits class against class. The bill of particulars against him goes on and on. Right now, it is thought, Bosch has lost a lot of political popularity. But Bosch is a spell-binder, who, in the opinion of U.S. diplomats, can win back much of his former popularity with a few speeches. Also disturbing to Americans is the return of exiled revolutionaries.

Concern was centered on Máximo López Molina, president of the Chinese-line MPD, or Popular Dominican Movement. López Molina had spent some time in Japan, recently moved to China—and had left China for the Dominican Republic when the provisional Government was formed—or seemed certain to be formed. The Institutional Act of the provisional government, written jointly by the OAS ad hoc committee and Dominicans of both sides, bans deportation or exile. By September 7, López Molina had reached Kingston, Jamaica. A way was found, next day, however, to block him. López Molina was shipped to Paris, where he maintains his permanent home in exile. Other key Communists, however, have returned.

García Godoy is working hand in glove with the Americans, and his goals apparently coincide with the main U.S. goals—unless, of course, there is another doublecross in the works.

U.S. officials here in Santo Domingo still talk about the beating they took from some of the U.S. press at the outset back in April, when Ambassador Bennett issued a call for the marines.

They continue to point out newly revealed evidence of Communist power within the rebel camp, to support their conclusion that U.S. intervention was necessary to save lives and keep the Communists from grabbing power.

U.S. intelligence now can demonstrate that nearly all the Communists who were listed as active when the revolt started still are important in the rebel zone.

AN INTERVIEW WITH WESSIN

Now we come to the case of Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. On Tuesday, September 7, the story broke that American officials had offered Wessin a bribe to leave the country.

That morning an anti-Communist Dominican newspaperman got me in to see Wessin—when four carloads of other newsmen were stopped at the outside gates.

The general said that two Americans had offered to buy his \$18,000 home—at any price he named—if he would leave the country and take a tour, as honored guest, of military establishments in Panama and the United States. Wessin said his reply was that he would sell his home for \$50,000.

October 8, 1965

25511

gladly, but that he would use the money to build another and better home, right in front of the old one.

Later that day, another high-ranking Dominican officer told me more about the case. He said that the CIA chief in Santo Domingo and an American military attaché went to Wessin's home at 2:30 a.m. on Sunday, September 5, with the bribe offer.

Next day, high U.S. officials told me a different story. They said no bribe had been offered, that Wessin initiated the meeting—but it was not at 2:30 in the morning. "It was much earlier than that." There had been other meetings, too. But Wessin asked for each of these, too.

Piecing these two stories together, with some things American officials told later, I think the story is this:

The United States, through Garcia Godoy, put the pressure on Wessin to get out of the country. Wessin dickered, explained he was a poor man, would have to sell his home, liquidate other assets. During the negotiations Wessin initiated individual meetings. Wessin did tell me that he, himself, set the price of \$50,000 on his home.

The story of the physical ouster of Wessin, at 8:05 on the evening of Thursday, September 9, reads like a paperback spy novel. Sometime during the night of September 8-9, Wessin began moving his tanks from the northern part of Santo Domingo back toward his base. He did not inform the Inter-American military headquarters in advance.

There was panic. Ambassador Bunker was pulled out of bed before 4:30 on Thursday morning. He was out of the hotel before 7. He didn't return until 5 in the afternoon.

Wessin's moves were confusing. On Wednesday morning he went before NBC cameras and made his bribe charges openly—the same charges that he had confided secretly to me only 24 hours earlier.

At the same time, Wessin seemed to be yielding to Garcia Godoy's urging that he accept a post abroad for the good of the country. Godoy offered him his choice of several posts. Wessin said, on Wednesday, that he would consider them, and made a date to visit Godoy and give his answer on Thursday morning.

Wessin didn't show up for that date with his commander in chief.

Somebody ordered the Inter-American Peace Force into action—presumably Mr. Bunker. Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, assistant division commander of the 82d Airborne, was sent to Wessin's office. By all accounts, there was a scene. Then, Wessin was escorted to General Deane's headquarters. He was hustled out, an American officer on each arm, and whisked back to his own headquarters, a few miles away.

Later, in the afternoon, an American Air Force C-130 landed at San Isidro. Some baggage was put aboard. U.S. soldiers and plainclothesmen, presumably FBI, guarded the plane. After dark, just before 8 p.m., Wessin arrived by U.S. helicopter, was rushed aboard the airplane, and flown off to Panama. His family was left behind. One of his aids, a major, was the only Dominican to see him off.

The "bum's rush" for Wessin had some bad effects.

American residents, as well as Dominicans, began recalling how Wessin had led the forces against the rebels in the first days. A legend began to grow. Wessin was credited with saving the country from communism in the days before the marines landed. Wessin began to seem 9 feet tall.

American military officers have a more solid, less emotional, objection. Most of them had liked Wessin, and admired him as a military man. Generally, they agree his military did hold off the Communists in April until the marines landed. It is the diplo-

rats who criticize his military actions during the first days.

But the main concern the American military men feel, as expressed by an officer who was brought in for a special high-level job, is this: For years, the United States has been training Latin American officers at Fort Gulick in Panama. These officers are indoctrinated with the idea that the United States depends on them as bulwarks against communism. What, asks the officer, are these Latin American officers going to think about the word of the United States now?

THE REBELS CELEBRATE VICTORY

Meanwhile, as General Wessin was being stripped of his military rank, retired from the Army and forced out of the country by the Americans, the rebels were celebrating their "victory."

At rebel headquarters, in the Copello Building on the main business street, El Conde, I talked with Bill Balles, an American airplane pilot who has been with the rebels almost from the start.

We commented on how the guns had all but disappeared from the streets of the rebel zone. Mr. Balles said the guns were still there—that the night before, when rumors spread that Wessin was going to invade, guns sprouted everywhere in the streets.

Mr. Balles was exuberant with what he believes is a rebel victory. He praised the job that had been done by the "American press."

He said, "You reporters saw through the brainwashing of the American Government," and then added, jokingly, "I am recommending that we strike a medal for the American reporters who covered this story."

One of the sources of strength Garcia Godoy hopes to keep, as a counter to the Communists in the rebel forces, is the military.

As of mid-July, the Dominican armed forces had the following strength figures: 10,000 Army; 3,800 Air Force; 3,600 Navy; more than 10,000 in national police; 1,700 in Wessin's armed forces training center.

I talked with high-ranking military officers, many of whom were gloomy.

One in particular I had seen several times, in May and July, when the purely military situation was much worse than it is now. But never had I seen him so gloomy.

This officer said:

"The situation is worse than anytime since April.

"During April and May, and into June, you at least could have faith in something—the military effort against communism. Now, even that faith has been shattered. The United States seemed to be against Communists then. Now it doesn't seem to be. The United States instead seems to be protecting the Communists.

"Exiled revolutionaries are coming back. Arms are not being collected.

"One provisional government, Imbert's, is out and another one is in—but still the Communists keep their control of downtown Santo Domingo. What did the compromise agreement accomplish?

"The Communists publish their newspapers—but the anti-Communists are ordered off the air, and have no newspapers."

The officer was puzzled by the United States—and said that he felt betrayed, adding:

"We cannot understand your Government. You send thousands to fight communism in Vietnam—but give in to the Communists here."

Neither does this officer think that all the rebel guns will be surrendered or found. He said 2,500 weapons were found in the northern part of the city, after the junta victory in May—but that many others still are there, hidden too well or too deeply to be detected. How many more are being hid-

den downtown, or in the rest of the country, the officer would not try to guess.

AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM

United States now has not only the political and military problems, but the formidable economic problem as well.

Here are some aspects of the aid problem: Government budget runs \$15 million a month. Collections fell to \$2 million in May, got up to \$9 million in September, are not expected to reach \$15 million before many months.

Sugar Corporation, Government-owned, loses money and has to borrow \$16 to \$18 million a year to operate. Production costs are higher than the low world prices.

Coffee, a prime export, is in trouble. A few years ago, the Dominican Republic cheated on the World Coffee Agreement, exported more than its quota. Now, it is being penalized. In addition, coffee prices on the world market are very low. Result is that the little coffeegrowers, out in the countryside, aren't able to sell their coffee beans—and don't understand why. That poses a political problem for Garcia Godoy—and the United States.

Cacao prices are down on the world market. Since Trujillo, the Dominican Republic has been importing more than it can afford. Trujillo was killed in 1961. He had kept a tight rein on imports, showed a yearly favorable balance in current trade accounts. The figures tell the story. Current trade balances, year by year, were: 1960—plus \$42.6 million; 1961—plus \$41.8 million; 1962—minus \$13.5 million; 1963—minus \$22.8 million; 1964—minus \$55.7 million.

All these problems are manageable, however, compared to the really big one:

This has been a country of easy living. People didn't need peso incomes to live. They could pick bananas and get along. But now that's not good enough for them. They want TV sets, and pesos in their pockets. They want schools for their children, and hospitals. Other people have these things, and they want them too. Only problem is that, while they want the benefits that come from a money economy, they don't really understand yet that they have to work for what they get.

Against these problems, and others, the U.S. mission for the Agency for International Development went to work on estimates of what was needed.

The mission came up with an estimate of \$30 million, to start with. It recommended that United States chip in \$20 million, the Dominican Republic the other \$10 million. President Johnson agreed, announced his \$20 million aid program.

Initial planning calls for use of the money in these ways:

Help make up the budget deficits, in monthly operating costs.

Pay half the 1-month salary bonus that all Government employees get in December.

Throw in some money to help rehabilitate manufacturing and business, generally—but not to help commerce.

Finance public works projects. Many already are underway, like the new water system being constructed for Santo Domingo. But in addition, Garcia Godoy is being given a "pot" of \$2 million to throw into public works in areas where it will do the most good politically. Idea is that United States wants Garcia Godoy to succeed, so U.S. money is being given to him to use for semipolitical purposes.

On September 5, 2 days after the Garcia Godoy government took office, the AID people went over the books with the Government. The Dominicans were surprised. They were "wealthier" than they had imagined.

They hadn't heard about President Johnson's promise of \$20 million—because there

25512

are no newspapers of general information in the capital.

But, in addition to that, they found that they had:

Thirty-two million dollars in loans negotiated by previous governments, but never drawn.

Twenty to thirty million dollars in new loans that will be available to finance projects the AID mission now is developing.

Six and one-half million dollars in OAS emergency aid that has not been spent yet.

Total aid given since April 24 ran to \$42 million. This was U.S. money, most of which was funneled through OAS.

One reason that \$6.5 million of this aid money has not yet been spent is that United States now is keeping a closer watch than ever on what is done with aid dollars in the Dominican Republic. In the past, officials say, much of the aid money went down the drain, in stopgap measures.

Now United States intends to be tougher, and make certain that aid extended will help make it possible to end aid later.

MEDICARE

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, despite the many words written about it, we continue to receive questions from people who are wondering about the operation of the Medicare Act and how it will affect them and their families. Better Homes & Gardens magazine for October 1965, has done an excellent job in answering these questions with an article entitled "The Simple Facts About Medicare."

I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PLAIN TALK ABOUT FAMILY HEALTH: THE SIMPLE FACTS ABOUT MEDICARE

WHAT MEDICARE WOULD PAY FOR A TYPICAL SERIOUS ILLNESS

Assume that a person 65 or older is covered by medicare's automatic hospital insurance and by the optional medical plan that costs \$3 a month. His doctor orders him into a hospital for an operation followed by 3 weeks of fairly intensive care, a total of 25 days. At \$26 a day for a semiprivate room, his basic bill is \$650. Drugs are an additional \$85. Lab tests and other hospital charges are \$115. His total bill is \$850. He pays \$40 and medicare pays \$810.

The surgeon's and anesthetist's fees, plus visits by the patient's own doctor during the hospitalization, total \$400. If he has already paid \$50 of medical expenses during the year, the patient's 20-percent share of this cost is \$80. Medicare pays \$320.

After leaving the hospital, he enters a nursing home for 30 days of additional recuperation. The cost is \$365, which includes drugs his doctor has prescribed. The first 20 days and the drug costs are paid in full by medicare. For the next 10 days he personally must contribute \$5 a day (\$50 altogether). Medicare pays the other \$15. While in the nursing home he also runs up a \$90 doctor bill. Medicare pays 80 percent of it (\$72). His own cost is thus \$18.

Total costs of the illness are \$1,705. Medicare pays \$1,517. The patient pays \$.88.

Despite the millions of words that have been written on medicare, you may still have doubts about how the new law will affect your family. Here are the answers to common, basic questions recently posed by readers:

How much will the law increase your payroll withholdings? How do you qualify for benefits? What is the extent of those ten-

sits? Is your wife's coverage different from yours? How can medicare increase your income tax deductions? Should you cancel your private health insurance policies?

You will help finance the medicare program, plus other expanded benefits, by paying social security tax on the first \$6,600 of your annual earnings after this year, instead of the present \$4,800. Also, the tax rate will go up to 4.2 percent. Thus on \$6,600 or more of earnings, your withholding for social security will be \$277.20, a yearly increase of \$103.20. Of this amount, \$23.10 will be earmarked for your "prepaid" hospital insurance after age 65. Rates will increase again in 1967, to a maximum of \$290.40, with \$33 of that annual tax amount set aside for medicare.

To this extent, your participation in medicare is compulsory. The supplementary insurance program covering doctor bills and certain other expenses is optional. If you sign up for it, the \$3-a-month premiums begin when you reach age 65. They will most likely be deducted from your social security retirement benefits. Voluntary insurance for your wife will cost an additional \$3 a month when she becomes 65.

To qualify for hospital insurance benefits once this part of the program begins on July 1, 1966, the only requirement is that you be 65. It isn't necessary even that you be covered by social security. (After 1967 this rule changes; persons who become 65 after that date will need to have had some work experience under social security.)

There is no "earnings test." You are entitled to full benefits under medicare even though you may have annual earnings over \$1,500 which prevent you from collecting part or all of your social security retirement pension.

For most families (the exceptions being those who otherwise couldn't or wouldn't get proper medical attention) the only change medicare will make in health care is the manner in which it's paid for. Your doctor will be of your own choosing, and he will continue to make all the medical decisions: when and where to hospitalize you, the type of treatment or surgery needed, how long you should remain in the hospital, and what post-hospital care, if any, you need.

When your doctor has admitted you to a hospital, you will simply be asked to show your health insurance card, similar to the Blue Cross card you may now have. Next spring, persons already 65 and receiving social security benefits will receive their cards in the mail. Others will need to apply at their nearest social security office.

Now to the extent of your benefits: Your medicare insurance covers up to 60 days of hospital costs after you pay the first \$40. For up to 30 additional days, you pay \$10 a day and medicare pays the balance. After 90 days in a hospital during a single spell of illness, the hospital benefits stop.

You can thus expect medicare to pick up the bill for the major share of your hospital expenses: room and board, drugs normally furnished by a hospital, operating room charges, care by hospital staff nurses, laboratory fees, and the use of an oxygen tent, wheelchair, or crutches.

Certain "extras," however, must come out of your own pocket: the extra cost of a private room unless your doctor certifies there is a medical need for isolation, the cost of a private duty nurse, and of course such items as TV rental. And unless you are covered by the supplementary insurance program, medicare will not pay doctor bills, in or out of the hospital.

At any time after your third day in the hospital, your doctor may decide you can be cared for just as well and at less expense in a private nursing home that has an arrangement with a hospital. After January 1, 1967, medicare will pay the full cost for up to 20 days of this type of extended care, plus

all costs over \$5 a day for an additional 80 days—a total of 100 days. And even after your discharge from a hospital (following at least a 3-day stay) or from an extended care facility, your doctor may prescribe additional medical services while you convalesce at home. If so, and if you are confined to your home, medicare will pay for as many as 100 visits during a 12-month period by a nurse, therapist, or part-time home health aid.

Suppose you suffer a relapse? If it has been less than 60 days since you left the hospital or nursing home, the relapse is considered part of the same "spell of illness" and you are entitled to any unused benefits. For example, assume your initial stay in the hospital was for 40 days and that within the next 60 days your doctor orders you readmitted. You would still have 20 days during which medicare would pay the full cost, plus 30 more days during which it would pay all costs over \$10 a day. And you'd have 100 days of extended care.

If your relapse were to occur after more than 60 days out of the hospital or nursing home, this would be considered a new spell of illness and you'd be eligible for a whole new round of benefits: hospital, nursing home, and at-home services.

Part of the cost of out-patient diagnostic services you get at a hospital also will be covered by medicare hospital insurance. This can occur even though you are not actually admitted to the hospital.

Examples: X-rays, blood tests, or an electrocardiogram. You pay the first \$20 and 20 percent of the cost over \$20; medicare pays the remaining 80 per cent. If the total cost is, say, \$60, you pay \$20 plus 20 percent of the remaining \$40—that is, \$8. This makes your total cost \$28. Medicare pays the other \$32 toward your bill.

As broad as the new medicare hospital insurance program is, it still falls far short of providing full protection for your after-65 medical needs. But much of what it doesn't cover, the new voluntary medical insurance plan does cover.

Subject to a deductible provision under which you pay the first \$50 of your medical expenses each year, the plan pays 80 percent of the additional costs of:

Physicians' and surgeons' care, without regard to where you receive it—in a hospital, clinic, office, home, or elsewhere. Included are the fees of any radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists who may be required.

Up to 100 home health service visits a year with no requirement of prior hospitalization.

The cost of X-rays, laboratory tests, and special therapy. Some of these expenses may be only partially covered by your hospital insurance, in which case the voluntary plan can be applied to the balance of the cost.

Surgical dressings, splints, casts, ambulance service, rental of equipment such as an iron lung or wheelchair for use in your home, braces, artificial limbs, and eyes.

But remember: insurance under this part of medicare is not automatic. You will need to enroll and agree to pay the \$3-a-month premium at age 65. What's more, there is a deadline. If you will be 65 by the end of this year, the deadline is next March 31. If your 65th birthday is after December 31, 1965, you will have a 7 month signup period that begins 3 months before your birthday. After that, the signup will be open to you only from October through December during odd-numbered years.

Don't let the deadline slip by. If for no other reason, you'd have to wait two years—without protection—for another opportunity to sign up. And unless you enroll within three years from the close of the first signup period available to you, you become permanently ineligible. Finally, there's a 10-percent-a-year increase in the premium for